国際連合安全保障理事会決議338
 国際連合安全保障理事会
決議338 | |
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| 日付： | 1973年10月22日 |
| 形式： | 安全保障理事会決議 |
| 会合： | 1,747回 |
| コード： | S/RES/338 |
| 文書： | 英語 |
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| 投票： | 賛成： 14 反対： 0 棄権： 1 |
| 主な内容： | 第四次中東戦争の停戦要請 |
| 投票結果： | 採択 |
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| 安全保障理事会（1973年時点） | |
| 常任理事国 | |
 中国.svg){kind=small} フランス.svg){kind=small} イギリス アメリカ合衆国.svg){kind=small} ソビエト連邦
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| 非常任理事国 | |
 オーストラリア オーストリア ギニア インドネシア インド
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 ケニア パナマ ペルー スーダン.svg){kind=small} ユーゴスラビア社会主義連邦共和国
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| 第四次中東戦争における領土の変化 | |
国際連合安全保障理事会決議338（こくさいれんごうあんぜんほしょうりじかいけつぎ338、英: United Nations Security Council Resolution 338）は、1973年10月22日に国際連合安全保障理事会で採択された決議である。第四次中東戦争に関係する。
アメリカ合衆国とソビエト連邦の共同提案に基づいて第四次中東戦争の停戦を要請するもので、決議が採択されてから12時間以内に停戦が発効するように規定された。「適切な支援（appropriate auspices）」という文言は国連ではなくアメリカ合衆国とソビエト連邦によるものと解釈され、この第3項により1973年12月のジュネーヴ会議のための枠組みが構築された。
この決議は、安保理の第1747回会合において、賛成14、棄権1（中華人民共和国）で採択されたが、依然として戦闘が続き、安保理決議339で停戦がなされた。
決議の内容は以下の通り。
The Security Council,Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
Binding or non-binding issue
The alleged importance of resolution 338 in the Arab–Israeli conflict supposedly stems from the word "decides" in clause 3 which is held to make resolution 242 binding. However, the decision in clause 3 does not relate to resolution 242, but rather to the need to begin negotiations on a just and durable peace in the Middle East that led to the Geneva Conference which Syria did not attend.
The argument continues; Article 25 of the United Nations Charter says that UN members "agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council". It is generally accepted that Security Council resolutions adopted according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the exercise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace in accordance with the UN Charter are binding upon the member states.[1][2]
Scholars applying this doctrine on the resolution assert that the use of the word "decide" makes it a "decision" of the Council, thus invoking the binding nature of article 25.[3] The legal force added to Resolution 242 by this resolution is the reason for the otherwise puzzling fact that SC 242 and the otherwise seemingly superfluous and superannuated Resolution 338 are always referred to together in legal documents relating to the conflict.
The more obvious need for the use of Resolution 338 is that it requires all parties to cease fire and states when that should occur, without which Resolution 242 can't be accomplished.
Some scholars have advanced the position that the resolution was passed as a non-binding Chapter VI recommendation.[4][5] Other commentators assert that it probably was passed as a binding Chapter VII resolution.[6] The resolution contains reference to neither Chapter VI nor Chapter VII.
決議の受諾
エジプトとイスラエルは10月22日に決議を受諾したが、シリア、イラク、ヨルダンは拒絶した[7][8]。
Execution requirements of the Resolution by Egypt and Israel
An October 22 United Nations-brokered ceasefire quickly unraveled, with each side blaming the other for the breach.[9]
- According to some sources, Egypt broke the cease-fire first:
The cease fire soon violated because Egypt's Third Army Corps tried to break free of the Israeli Army's encirclement. The Egyptian action and the arrival of more Soviet equipment to Cairo permitted Israel to tighten its grip on the Egyptians[10]
- According to other sources, Israel broke the cease-fire first:
On October 22 the superpowers brokered UN Security Council Resolution 338. It provided the legal basis for ending the war, calling for a cease-fire to be in place within twelve hours, implementation of Resolution 242 'in all its parts' and negotiations between the parties. This marked the first occasion the Soviets had endorsed direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israel without conditions or qualifications. Golda Meir, the Israeli Ptine Minister, who was not consulted, was offended by this fait accompli, though she had little option but to comply.
Nevertheless, Meir was determined to gain the maximum strategic advantage before the final curtain came down on the conflict. Given the entanglement of the Egyptian and Israeli armies, the temptation was too great for the Israelis to resist. After a final push in the Sinai expelled the Egyptians, Meir gave the order to cross the Canal.
Israel's refusal to stop fighting after a United Nations cease-fire was in place on October 22 nearly involved the Soviet Union in the military confrontation.[11] [12][13]
中東和平の外交と条約
- ファイサル・ヴァイツマン協定
- パリ講和会議
- 1949年の停戦協定
- キャンプ・デービッド合意
- エジプト・イスラエル平和条約
- 中東和平会議
- オスロ合意
- イスラエル・ヨルダン平和条約
- Camp David 2000 Summit
- Israeli–Palestinian peace process
- Projects working for peace among Israelis and Arabs
- List of Middle East peace proposals
- International law and the Arab–Israeli conflict
関連項目
脚注
- ^ Higgins, Rosalyn, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions Are Binding Under Article 25 of the Charter?, in 21 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 286 1972 pp. 270–266, pp. 285–286
- ^ "Legal Consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)" in [1971] I.C.J. Reports pp. 4–345, pp 52–53
- ^ Rostow, Eugene V. "The Illegality of the Arab Attack on Israel of October 6, 1973." The American Journal of International law, 69(2), 1975, pp. 272–289.
- ^ Adler, Gerald M., Israel and Iraq: United Nations Double Standards – UN Charter Article 25 and Chapters VI and VII (2003) [1]
- ^ Einhorn, Talia, "The Status of Palestine/Land of Israel and Its Settlement Under Public International Law" in Nativ Online No.1 Dec. (2003) [2]
- ^ Kattan, Victor,Israel, Hezbollah, and the use and abuse of self-defence in international law (2006) [3]
- ^ Electronic Jewish Encyclopedia http://www.eleven.co.il/article/10954
- ^ 232. Memorandum of Conversation, Tel Aviv, October 22, 1973, 2:30–4:00 p.m // Arab–Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, р. 662–666
- ^ “Archived copy”. 2016年2月1日時点のオリジナルよりアーカイブ。2013年3月22日閲覧。
- ^ Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations by Lester H. Brune and Richard Dean Burns (Nov 22, 2002)
- ^ [Academic Journal.Stephens, Elizabeth. "Caught on the hop: the Yom Kippur War: Elizabeth Stephens examines how thirty-five years ago this month the surprise invasion of Israel by Egypt and its allies started the process that led to Camp David." History Today 58.10 (2008): 44+. World History In Context. Web. 1 Mar. 2013.]
- ^ “The Office of the Historian.Arab-Israeli War 1973.”. 2013年3月9日時点のオリジナルよりアーカイブ。2013年3月22日閲覧。
- ^ The National Security Archive .The October War and U.S. Policy.