アメリカ合衆国憲法第1条

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アメリカ合衆国憲法第1条(Article One of the United States Constitution)は、米国連邦政府立法府であるアメリカ合衆国議会を設立した。 第1条の下では、議会は衆議院下院で構成される二院制の立法府です。 第1条は、議会にさまざまな列挙された権限と、それらの権限を実行するために「必要かつ適切な」法律を通過させる能力を付与する。 第1条はまた、法案を可決するための手続きを確立し、議会の権限と州がその権限を乱用することを制限する。第1条の最高条項は、すべての連邦立法権を議会に付与し、議会が衆議院と上院で構成されることを確立する。第2条および第3条の権利行使条項と組み合わせて、第1条の権利権分立条項は、連邦政府の3つの支部間の権力分立を確立する。

第2節は衆議院を取り上げ、下院の議員は2年ごとに選出され、議会の議席は人口に基づいて州に割り当てられることを定めている。州議会の最大の議会の選挙に投票する資格のある個人が衆議院の選挙に投票する権利があるという規定を含む、衆議院のさまざまな規則が含まれています。

第3節は上院を取り上げ、上院は各州の2人の上院議員で構成され、各上院議員は6年の任期を務めます。セクション3は当初、州議会が上院議員を選出することを要求していましたが、1913年に批准された第17修正は、上院議員の直接選挙を規定しています。セクション3は、米国の副大統領を上院の大統領として確立する規定を含む、上院のための他のさまざまな規則を示しています。

第4節は、州に議会選挙プロセスを規制する権限を付与しますが、議会がそれらの規制を変更したり、独自の規制を作成したりできることを確立します。セクション4はまた、議会が少なくとも年に1回集会することを要求している。

第5節は、両方の議会のさまざまな規則を定め、衆議院と上院に、自分たちの選挙を判断し、自分たちのメンバーの資格を決定し、自分たちのメンバーを罰するか追放する権限を与えます。

第6節は、議会の役職に就いている人々の報酬、特権、および制限を確立します。

第7節は、法案を可決するための手順を示しており、合衆国大統領の拒否権を条件として、両院が法案を可決することを要求しています。第7条に基づき、大統領は法案に拒否権を行使することができますが、議会は両院の3分の2の投票で大統領の拒否権を無効にすることができます。

第8節は、議会の権限を示しています。これには、「税金、義務、課徴金、および税金」(提供された義務、課徴金、および税金は米国全体で統一されている)を制定および徴収する権限を含む、いくつかの列挙された権限が含まれます。米国」、州間および国際商取引を規制する権限、自然化法を設定する権限、お金をコイン化して規制する権限、米国の信用でお金を借りる権限、郵便局と郵便道路を設立する権限、最高裁判所に劣る連邦裁判所を設立する権限、陸軍と海軍を育成し支援する権限、「連邦の法律を執行し、暴動を抑制し、侵略を撃退するために」民兵を召喚する権限民兵の「組織化、武装、懲戒...そして統治」を提供し、議会に戦争を宣言する権限を与える。セクション8はまた、議会に国の首都として機能する連邦地区を設立する権限を与え、議会にその地区を管理する独占的な権限を与えます。さまざまな列挙された権限に加えて、セクション8は、議会に、列挙された権限およびそれに付与されたその他の権限を実行するために必要かつ適切な法律を作成する権限を付与します。

第9節は、議会の権限にさまざまな制限を課し、私権剥奪法やその他の慣行を禁止しています。

第10節は、州に制限を課し、国が外国勢力との同盟を結ぶこと、契約を損なうこと、検査に必要な最低レベルを超える輸出入に課税すること、軍隊を維持すること、または議会の同意なしに戦争に従事することを禁じています。

第1節:議会に付与された立法権[編集]

2011年1月5日、第112議会の様子
この憲法によって付与されるすべての立法権は、合衆国連邦議会に帰属する。連邦議会は上院と下院で構成される。

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Section 1 is a vesting clause that bestows federal legislative power exclusively to Congress. Similar clauses are found in Articles II and III. The former confers executive power upon the President alone, and the latter grants judicial power solely to the federal judiciary. These three articles create a separation of powers among the three branches of the federal government. This separation of powers, by which each branch may exercise only its own constitutional powers and no others,[1][2] is fundamental to the idea of a limited government accountable to the people.

The separation of powers principle is particularly noteworthy in regard to the Congress. The Constitution declares that the Congress may exercise only those legislative powers "herein granted" within Article I (as later limited by the Tenth Amendment).[3] It also, by implied extension, prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative authority to either of the other branches of government, a rule known as the nondelegation doctrine.[4] However, the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress does have the latitude to delegate regulatory powers to executive agencies as long as it provides an "intelligible principle" which governs the agency's exercise of the delegated regulatory authority.[5] That the power assigned to each branch must remain with that branch, and may be expressed only by that branch, is central to the theory.[6] The nondelegation doctrine is primarily used now as a way of interpreting a congressional delegation of authority narrowly,[7] in that the courts presume Congress intended only to delegate that which it certainly could have, unless it clearly demonstrates it intended to "test the waters" of what the courts would allow it to do.[8]

Although not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, Congress has also long asserted the power to investigate and the power to compel cooperation with an investigation.[9] The Supreme Court has affirmed these powers as an implication of Congress's power to legislate.[10] Since the power to investigate is an aspect of Congress's power to legislate, it is as broad as Congress's powers to legislate.[11] However, it is also limited to inquiries that are "in aid of the legislative function;"[12] Congress may not "expose for the sake of exposure."[13] It is uncontroversial that a proper subject of Congress's investigation power is the operations of the federal government, but Congress's ability to compel the submission of documents or testimony from the President or his subordinates is often-discussed and sometimes controversial (see executive privilege), although not often litigated. As a practical matter, the limitation of Congress's ability to investigate only for a proper purpose ("in aid of" its legislative powers) functions as a limit on Congress's ability to investigate the private affairs of individual citizens; matters that simply demand action by another branch of government, without implicating an issue of public policy necessitating legislation by Congress, must be left to those branches due to the doctrine of separation of powers.[14] The courts are highly deferential to Congress's exercise of its investigation powers, however. Congress has the power to investigate that which it could regulate,[11] and the courts have interpreted Congress's regulatory powers broadly since the Great Depression.

脚注[編集]

  1. ^ See Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1062 (Ct. Cl. 1977) ("The purpose of the [Vesting Clause] is to locate the central source of legislative authority in Congress, rather than the Executive or the Judiciary."), abrogated on other grounds by INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
  2. ^ See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) ("Our Federal Constitution... divide[s] the governmental power into three branches. The first is the legislative, the second is the executive, and the third is judicial, and the rule is that in the actual administration of the government Congress... should exercise the legislative power, the President... the executive power, and the courts or the judiciary the judicial power....")
  3. ^ See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 592 (1995) ("[Certain] comments of Hamilton and others about federal power reflected the well-known truth that the new Government would have only the limited and enumerated powers found in the Constitution.... Even before the passage of the Tenth Amendment, it was apparent that Congress would possess only those powers 'herein granted' by the rest of the Constitution.").
  4. ^ See Touby v. the United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) ("From [the language of this section of the Constitution] the Court has derived the nondelegation doctrine: that Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of Government.").
  5. ^ See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409 ("If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [administer a statutory scheme] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
  6. ^ Essays on Article I: Legislative Vesting Clause”. The Heritage Foundation. Template:Cite webの呼び出しエラー:引数 accessdate は必須です。
  7. ^ See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989) (nondelegation doctrine takes the form of "giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional").
  8. ^ UAW v. Occupational Health & Safety Admin., 938 F.2d 1310, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("In effect [the nondelegation doctrine as a principle of statutory interpretation is used by the courts to] require a clear statement by Congress that it intended to test the constitutional waters."); cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.... This approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it." (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 499–501, 504 (1979), and Grenada County Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U.S. 261 (1884))); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) ("[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance.").
  9. ^ Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959) ("The power of inquiry has been employed by Congress throughout our history, over the whole range of the national interests concerning which Congress might legislate or decide upon due investigation not to legislate; it has similarly been utilized in determining what to appropriate from the national purse, or whether to appropriate."); e.g., 3 Annals of Congress 490–94 (1792) (House committee appointed to investigate the defeat of Gen. St. Clair by Indians empowered to "call for such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.").
  10. ^ See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174–75 (1927) ("[T]he power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. It was so regarded and employed in American Legislatures before the Constitution was framed and ratified.... A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information-which not infrequently is true-recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed. All this was true before and when the Constitution was framed and adopted. In that period the power of inquiry, with enforcing process, was regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate-indeed, was treated as inhering in it. Thus there is ample warrant for thinking... that the constitutional provisions which commit the legislative function to the two houses are intended to include this attribute to the end that the function may be effectively exercised.").
  11. ^ a b See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) ("The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste."); Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111 ("The scope of the power of inquiry... is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.").
  12. ^ Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 189 (1881).
  13. ^ Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200.
  14. ^ See McGrain, 273 U.S. at 170 ("[N]either house of Congress possesses a ‘general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen’;... the power actually possessed is limited to inquiries relating to matters of which the particular house ‘has jurisdiction’ and in respect of which it rightfully may take other action; [and] if the inquiry relates to ‘a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by a judicial proceeding’ it is not within the range of this power, but must be left to the courts, conformably to the constitutional separation of governmental powers...." (quoting Kilbourne, 103 U.S. at 193)); see also Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 295 (1929) ("Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits...."), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).

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